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 1. Introduction: 
In this paper we analyse the impact of piracy on innovation, especially in the 
digital industry, when innovation is associated with both technological and market 
uncertainties
1. The literature on piracy and innovation only looks at the technological 
uncertainty aspect of innovation where the R&D investment of a firm materialises 
into a new product with some probability. However, innovation also has a market 
uncertainty aspect when multiple firms compete simultaneously to develop a new 
product but the success of a firm in patenting its product is stochastic. We attempt to 
bridge this gap and bring together these two strands of the literature.  
Piracy has generally been perceived as having a damaging influence on 
software and media industry sectors that have high information and digital content 
since such products can be copied at a low cost (Marshall, 1999; Straub and Nance, 
1990). This issue assumes importance not only because of the high magnitude of 
immediate loss in retail sale but also of its possible detrimental effects on the 
incentive to innovate. Business Software Alliance (BSA) believes that “local software 
industries crippled from competition with high-quality pirated software” and 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) in its 2005 Commercial 
Piracy Reports argues that “the illegal music trade is destroying creativity and 
innovation”
2. In an empirical study, Ding and Liu (2009) show that under weak IPR 
regimes piracy dissuades the legal firms to continue research on the development of 
new technologies. Park and Ginarte (1996) also supports this observation. 
  In this paper we show that piracy unambiguously retards the incentive to 
innovate and has adverse effects on profit if there is a single innovating firm facing 
technological uncertainty. However, if we introduce R&D competition that creates 
                                                 
1 The terms technological uncertainty and market uncertainty have been introduced by Shy (2000). 
2 BSA in their 2005 Piracy Study claims US$34 billion in worldwide losses. BSA further projects that 
in the next five years almost US$200 billion worth of software will be pirated globally.  
  2market uncertainty along with technological uncertainty then piracy may result in a 
higher level of R&D investment and profit of a firm. This follows from the fact that 
piracy lowers the competing firms’ reaction functions with respect to the level of 
R&D investment. The equilibrium R&D investment in the presence of piracy thus 
depends on the relative size of the shifts in the reaction functions. We also show that 
if the difference between the probabilities of success of the innovating firms is 
relatively large then piracy enhances the R&D investment and profit of the firm with 
the lower probability of success.  
The literature addressing the impact of piracy on innovation focuses on single 
innovating firm and show that piracy can have both detrimental and beneficial impact 
on innovation. Novos and Waldman (1984) show that increases in copyright 
protection could increase social welfare loss due to underproduction. Qiu (2006) 
shows that, if copyright protection is weak, software is not developed for general use 
but only for custom demands. Jaisingh (2009) shows that stricter regulatory 
enforcement policies raise the legitimate product quality which can be used as a 
measure of innovation.  
  A beneficial aspect of piracy can be in the form of providing insight into 
emerging market trends and specific consumer requirements. Easley et al. (2003) 
empirically show that the presence of piracy in the music industry induces firms to 
develop internet technologies and electronic modes of distributing music files.
3 
Connor and Rumelt (1991) show that piracy can be a channel of advertising the legal 
product directed at target consumers.  
                                                 
3 The gaming company Valve Software, when hackers used their Half Life game engine to develop a 
game called Counter Strike, Valve took the illegal game software and marketed it themselves, selling 
over 1.5 million copies (Barnes, 2005). Apple Computer, in a strategic reaction to P2P file sharing 
technologies, launched the iTunes online music library that was easy to navigate and explore, with free 
music previews, and allowed flexible download and copying for personal use. See Choi and Perez 
(2007) for anecdotal evidences on legal firms adopting technologies used by illegal P2P file sharers.  
  3Piracy can also generate a positive feedback effect on innovation with the 
pirate modifying and improving on the original product thereby inducing further 
innovation by the legitimate firms (Kolm 2006; Harbi and Grolleau, 2008).
4 In such 
situations, the legal producers sometimes do not insist on severe punishments against 
pirates (Barnett, 2005; Barnett et al., 2008; Raustila and Sprigman, 2006). 
The above literature, to the best of our knowledge, has not looked at R&D 
competition between innovating firms. The closest work in the spirit of our paper is 
by Shapiro (2006) who models simultaneous and independent inventions, in the 
context of prior rights, when two firms successfully realize the targeted innovation, 
but only one file for the patent.  
There are incentive and strategic relations between patent race and innovation. 
Incentive relation points at the positive two-way causal relation between patents and 
innovations. That is, a change in patenting cost has a direct effect on the incentive to 
innovate and applications for patents and vice versa. So in this case R&D and patents 
are treated as complements in the production process.
5 Hunt (2006) shows that in the 
presence of R&D competition and costless imitation, reduction of patent costs may 
lower R&D activity under certain conditions.
6 Kultti et al. (2006) observes that too 
much patent race reduces innovation
7.  
Strategic relations involve firms using patents to deter entry of competing 
firms. This literature treats R&D and patents as strategic substitutes. In a study on the 
computer industry in the U.S., Bessen and Hunt (2003) show that lowering of patent 
                                                 
4 This is especially true for design based industries where being pirated is a signal of the high quality of 
the legal product, and products which ‘are not faked are considered too weak to generate consumer 
demand and are consequently not produced’ (WhiteHall, 2006). Ritson (2007) says that pirated goods 
are indicative of heralding a brand’s renaissance and a brand dies if no copies appear in the market.  
5 See Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) for a review. 
6 This ‘counterintuitive’ phenomenon can be observed in industries that are highly technology intensive 
such as, semiconductors, electronics and computers (Hunt 2004, 2006). 
7 Cohen et al. (2000) and Gallini (2002) suggest secrecy is a better strategy than patents in protecting 
innovation and the role of patents lie in encouraging information disclosure rather than R&D 
investments. 
  4standards raises firms’ propensities to file for more patents.
  In this paper we try to 
link the literature on patent race and innovation to that on innovation and piracy. 
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present the model with a 
single innovating firm. In Section 2 we present the model with single innovating firm. 
In Section 3 we introduce R&D competition. In section 4 we present an example 
using specific functional form and Section 5 contains the concluding remarks.  
2. The model  
Let us consider the market for a product like software that faces piracy. We 
first consider the case where there is only one firm investing in R&D technology in 
order to increase its profit over and above a reservation level,  i π . For simplicity we 
assume  0 i π = . Let   be the R&D investment of a firm Fi, and the probability that Fi 
is successful in developing the product is 
i R
) ( i i R k α  with the properties  0 ) ( > ′ i R α  and 
0 ) ( < ′ ′ i R α .
8   can be viewed as the R&D efficiency parameter.  i k
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by  [ ] 1 , 0   , ∈ θ θ . θ  is assumed to 
follow a uniform distribution. We assume there is no resale market for used software. 
Each consumer is assumed to purchase only one unit of the software. The utility of a 
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θ          (1) 
θ  is the consumer’s valuation of the software and   is the price of one unit of the 
software. Thus, in the model, consumers differ from one another on the basis of their 
valuation of the software. 
m p
m θ  is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between 
buying and not buying:  
                                                 
8 These properties ensure that the second order condition for profit maximization hold. 
  5m m m m m p p U = ⇒ = − = θ θ θ 0 ) ( .         ( 2 )  
  From equation (2) we get the demand function as, 
m m p d p D
m
− = = ∫ 1 ) (
1
θ
θ .          ( 3 )  
So Fi’s expected profit is, 
i m m i i i R p p R k E − − = ) 1 )( ( α π         ( 4 )  
Fi’s realised profit conditional on successful innovation, is the monopoly 
profit, 
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equilibrium R&D investment and the expected profit denoted as   and   is 
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≥ .ensures non-negative profit. 
Let us now introduce piracy in the model. In the first stage Fi chooses a level 
of R&D investment   and in the second stage engages in price competition with the 
commercial pirate who sells illegal copies of Fi’s product.  
i R
With the availability of the pirated product, a consumer can either purchase 
Fi’s product or the pirated product or nothing. Let q denote the quality of the pirated 
product which is common knowledge and we assume  ) 1   , 0 (   ∈ q .
9 The utility of a 
type-θ consumer is as follows. 
                                                 
9 See Banerjee (2003) and Takeyama (1998) for more on the assumption that the legitimate and the 
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θ) (     (5) 
θ q    is the type-θ  consumer’s effective valuation of the pirated software.   and   
are the prices of the legitimate and the pirated software.  
m p c p
The marginal consumer indifferent between purchasing the legitimate product 





cm c cm m cm −
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θ θ θ . The marginal consumer indifferent between 





c0 c c0 = ⇒ = − θ θ 0 . Using the expressions for  cm θ  and  c0 θ  we get the demand 
functions for the legitimate and the pirated products as follows.  
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 is the realized stage 2 profit of Fi conditional on 
successful innovation in stage 1. The pirate can compete with Fi only if the latter is 
successful in innovation. 
We solve for the game using the method of backward induction. In stage 2 of 













p =  Solving the reaction functions yield the equilibrium 
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=      (8) 
Substituting the expressions in (8) in Fi’s expected profit function in equation 
(7) and differentiating with respect to   and equating to zero yields the equilibrium 
R&D investment, denoted as  , and the equilibrium expected profit of Fi, denoted 













R = ′ α  and  .   and   are increasing in ki 





P R r R k E − =














≥  ensures non-negative profit. 
From Lemma 2 we observe that an improvement in the quality of the pirated 
software reduces a firm’s incentive to innovate. Let us now compare the R&D levels 
with and without piracy to have an understanding of the impact of piracy on the 
incentive to innovate when there is a single innovating firm facing technological 
uncertainty. This leads us to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. Piracy reduces the incentive to innovate when there is a single 
innovating firm. 
Proof of Proposition 1.  . 0
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0 ) ( > ′ i R α  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ i R α  it implies   for all   because by 
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  83. R&D race and piracy 
Let us now introduce R&D competition between two firms F1 and F2. 
Hereafter, we will refer to this as R&D race and denote it as the R-game. In stage one 
the firms compete in R&D investment and the winner of the race receives the patent 
and is the monopolist in stage 2. So in stage 2 the winner of the R&D race faces the 
demand function as given in equation (3) and the stage 2 realized monopoly profit is 
4
1 * = i r .  
A firm can win the race if it is successful in innovation and the rival firm is 
unsuccessful or if both firms are successful then each firm receives the patent with 
equal probability. So the probability of Fi  1, 2, i = receiving the patent is,  
. , 2 , 1 . ,
2
) ( ) (
)) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( j i j i
R k R k
R k R k R R
j j i i
j j i i j i i ≠ = + − =
α α
α α μ           (9) 
Hence, the expected profit of Fi  1, 2, i =  is 
. , 2 , 1 , ,
2
) ( ) (
)) ( 1 )( (
* j i    j i    R r
R k R k
R k R k E i i
j j i i
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The first order conditions yield, 
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Let us now consider R&D race in the presence of piracy. We will denote this 
as the RP-game. In stage 1 of the game two firms F1 and F2 compete in R&D 
investment. The winner of the patent competes in price with the commercial pirate in 
stage 2. The probability that a firm Fi wins the patent is the same as in equation (9). 
  9The utility function and the demand functions facing the winner of the patent and the 
pirate are the same as given in equations (5) and (6). So the realised stage 2 profit of 
the winner of the R&D race is  2
* *
) 4 (





=  as given in equation (8). The expected 
profit of Fi is,  
.    , 2 , 1 ,    ,
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The first order conditions yield,  
* *
* * 2





























,            (14) 
* *
* * 2




























.           (15) 
Let   be the solution to equations (14) and (15).
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Dividing equation (14) by (11) we get at the optimum,  
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This implies,  
.
)) ( 2 (
























                            (17) 
Similarly, dividing equation (15) by (12) we get at the optimum,  
. 1
)) ( 2 )( (
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This implies,  
                                                 
10 The superscript “RP” denotes the game where there is R&D race and  piracy. 
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Using (17) and (19) we can provide some comparison between   and   
and the result is summarized in Proposition 2. We include the proof in the main text 
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then  . This cannot be true since we started with the 
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 Using (19) this implies that 
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  The intuition behind this result follows from the fact that the reaction 
functions in the R-game as given in equations (11) and (12) are below the reaction 
functions in the RP-game as given by the equations (14) and (15) because 
* * *
2 2
i i r r
> . 
This means that for given level of  , Fi needs a lower level of   in the RP-game 
compared to that in the R-game, that is, piracy shifts the reaction functions of the two 
firms in the downward direction. Hence, the equilibrium R&D investment of the two 
firms in the presence of piracy will depend on the relative size of the shifts of the 
reaction functions. This is diagrammatically represented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Reaction Curves 
  R
R  is the equilibrium point of the R-game and the reaction functions are 
denoted as   and  . The reaction functions of the RP-game lies below the ones 
in the The intersection of the reaction functions of the RP-game must be below the 
curve drawn in bold which is the envelope of the top part of Fi’s reaction function in 
the R-game labelled as   and the bottom part of Fj’s reaction function labelled as 










Let us fix the reaction function of Fi in the RP-game at  represented by 
the dashed curve. Now we consider a relatively “small” shift in the reaction function 
of Fj compared to the shift in the reaction function of Fi when we move from the R-
game to the RP-game. Then the equilibrium is at the point A where 
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  13“large” shift in the reaction function of Fj due to piracy, denoted as  , to intersect 
at the point C that satisfies  and . This explains part (ii) of 












i R R >
The precise location will depend on the relative positions of each firm’s 
reaction functions in the two games. The contention of this study, as summarised in 
proposition 2, is that it is not optimal for both the innovating firms to increase their 
R&D investment in the presence of piracy. Below we try to provide an intuitive 
explanation of Proposition 2. 
R&D decision is associated with two costs – the loss of the R&D investment 
in the event of technological failure and the loss of the entire profit in the event of a 
market failure of the innovation. Hence, provided that the profit exceeds the cost of 
innovation, the objective of a firm would be to increase the probability of success of 
the R&D. Market uncertainty being same for both firms and the presence of piracy 
affecting the profits of the innovating firms similarly, they should push to minimise 
technological uncertainty. An innovating firm with higher efficiency can reach the 
same probability of technological success with a lower level of R&D effort compared 
to an innovating firm with lower efficiency. Thus, as the less efficient firm increases 
its innovation level (such that its expected profit is positive) to increase the 
probability of a technological success the best response of the more efficient firm will 
be to reduce cost through a lower innovation level and vice versa. Thus no 
equilibrium is possible in the area B (excluding the dotted lines) as it is not optimal 
for both firms Fi and Fj to increase R&D investments in the presence of a pirate in the 
output market. This leads us to Proposition 3.  
  14Proposition 3. If   and   holds then piracy increases the 
equilibrium R&D investment of Fi and there is an overall increase in the R&D 
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Proposition 3 suggests that piracy can enhance the overall R&D investment 
under certain conditions where the increase in R&D effort by one firm exceeds the 
decrease in R&D investment by the other innovating firm given competition from the 
pirate in the product market. In the next section we provide an example using a 
specific functional form of  .   ) ( i R α
4. An Example 
  In this section we provide an example for the above general analysis. We 
assume that  i i i i R k R k = ) ( α . Using this form we get the equilibrium R&D 
investments and expected profits of Fi for the R and RP games. The results are 
summarised in Lemmas 3 and 4.  
Lemma 3. In the R-game, 
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We get the equilibrium R&D investments by solving equations (11) and (12) 
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  15Lemma 4. The equilibrium R&D investments and expected profits of Fi in the RP-
game are,  j i   j i  
r k k
r k r k
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We get the result by solving equations (14) and (15) using  i i i i R k R k = ) ( α . 
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also satisfies the second order conditions in the RP-game and hence this assumption 
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allow us to determine the effect of piracy on innovation when there is R&D race. The 
result is summarized in Proposition 4. We include the proof in the main text as it is 
instructive.  
Proposition 4. Piracy enhances R&D investment of Fi in the presence of R&D race if 
.   0 ) 16 ( 4 ) 16 ( 4 ) 256 (
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ri . So the sign of Ai 
depends on the sign of the numerator. Simplifying the numerator we get 
 which can be either positive 
zero or negative. If   it implies 
) 16 ( 4 16 ( 4 ) 256 (
2 2 2 2 * *
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i R .            Q.E.D. 
Let us discuss the implications of Proposition 4 by analysing the impact of the 
different strengths of   and   on the incentive to innovate in the presence of piracy 
when there is R&D race. We will be focusing on the expression Bi for the analysis. 
i k j k
j i k k = Consider the symmetric case  . So,  . 
Now  ,   and  , since by assumption   
and 
) 1 4 )(
* * * * − i r
4 < i k  
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2 − i k 16 ( = i B
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2 * * 2
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( 4 )( 4
* * + i r
) 1 4 (
* * − i r
0  
Next let us look at the combinations of ki and kj that keeps the value of Bi 
unchanged. We will call them the Bi-curves. Total differentiation of 
 with respect to ki and kj yields, 
. The first expression 
on the L.H.S is negative because  . The second expression on the L.H.S 
is positive because   and 
) 16 ( 4 16 ( 4 ) 256
2 2 2 2
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  17because  . This means an increase in ki for a given kj reduces Bi. The Bi-curves 
are represented diagrammatically in Figure 2 and the intuition is provided 
subsequently. Along the ki=kj line Bi<0. So the Bi=0 curve which is 
1 4
* * < i r













=  lies above the ki=kj line. The Bi-curves are 














 it means that higher 
values of Bi are associated with higher Bi-curves. 
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Figure 2: Bi-curves 
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11 The concavity of the Bi-curves as shown in Figure 1 is only for illustrative purpose. The concavity is 
not necessary for the analysis. 
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  The upward sloping property of the Bi-curves is because the rate at which 
 increases due to an increase in ki is less than that of  . Consequently, an 
increase in ki reduces the gap between   and   thereby lowering the value of 
Bi. The opposite is the case for kj. An increase in kj reduces both   and   but 
the rate of reduction of the former is less than that of the latter resulting in an increase 
in Bi. Thus a decrease in ki and an increase in kj results in higher values of Bi. This 

















i R  is positive.  
  The following table provides a numerical example for certain values of q 
(which is the quality of the pirated product) and  . We have fixed kj at 3.9 for the 
entire analysis which satisfies the second order condition
j k
j i j i ki ≠ = < , 2 , 1 , , 4.  F o r  






i R but the increase in 
P R
i R
,  is less than the increase in
R
i R . Also, as q 
  19decreases from 0.9 to 0.8 to 0.7 we see that the negativity of Bi begins at progressively 
higher values of ki. That is for lower qualities of the pirated product the asymmetricity 
between ki and kj required for the enhancement of R&D investment in the presence of 
piracy decreases. This example shows that if a firm’s probability of success in 
innovation is relatively small compared to its rival then its incentive to invest in 
innovation is higher in the presence of piracy than in its absence. 
Table: Comparative Static Analysis of Ri,j with the Probability Parameter ki,j 
q   * *






i R  
0.9 0.0416233  3.3  3.9  0.06259  0.0588643  0.0577005 
0.9 0.0416233  3.31  3.9  0.02771  0.0590492  0.0585266 
0.9  0.0416233  3.32  3.9  -0.00728  0.0592342  0.0593734 
0.9 0.0416233  3.33  3.9  -0.04237  0.0594192  0.0602419 
0.9  0.0416233  3.7  3.9  -1.41493  0.0663107  0.122365 
0.9 0.0416233  3.75  3.9  -1.61149  0.067249  0.140705 
0.8 0.078125  3.6  3.9  0.311008  0.106887  0.0966059 
0.8 0.078125  3.65  3.9  0.014866  0.108619  0.108068 
0.8  0.078125  3.7  3.9  -0.285361  0.110361  0.122365 
0.8 0.078125  3.75  3.9  -0.589672  0.112116  0.140705 
0.7  0.110193  3.7  3.9  0.397967  0.140668  0.122365 
0.7 0.110193  3.75  3.9  0.048829  0.1433  0.140705 
0.7  0.110193  3.8  3.9  -0.304997  0.14597  0.165092 
0.7 0.110193  3.85  3.9  -0.663509  0.14868  0.199118 
 
5. Conclusion 
The literature on piracy and innovation shows that piracy can have both 
beneficial and adverse impacts on innovative efforts by firms. This paper attempts to 
link the literature on piracy and innovation to that on innovation and patent race by 
  20analysing the impact of piracy on R&D decision of a firm under the assumptions of 
technological and market uncertainties. In an environment where the success of R&D 
investment is stochastic, we show that piracy unambiguously retards innovation under 
technological uncertainty when there is one innovating firm. However, in the presence 
of R&D competition, or market uncertainty, we show that piracy may enhance 
innovation.  
The last result depends on the relative position of the innovating firms’ 
reaction functions in the case of R&D race without piracy to that in the R&D race 
with piracy. We showed that it is possible for one firm’s R&D to increase in the 
presence of piracy. Using a specific functional form of the probability of success we 
showed that piracy enhances the R&D investment and profit of a less efficient firm if 
the difference between the probability of success of the two innovating firms is 
sufficiently large.  
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Proof of Lemma 3: Maximizing equation (6) with respect to   yields Fi’s reaction 
function which is 
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